The under-representation of ethnic minorities in elected bodies is hardly a North American phenomenon. The same applies in European countries for which we have information regarding the ethnic composition of parliaments or local councils, including Norway and Sweden (Bäck and Soininen, 1998; Bjørklund and Kval, 2001; Bjørklund and Bergh, 2005; Geddes, 1993 Geddes, , 1995 Geddes, , 1998 Goulbourne, 1998) . It is therefore surprising that the number of ethnic minorities in both the national parliament and local councils in Denmark almost corresponds to their number in the general population.
The article focuses on the representation of ethnic minorities in local councils in Denmark. Local elections are especially interesting, because immigrants who retain their foreign citizenship have been eligible to vote and run for election in local elections in Denmark since 1981. Other things being equal, we would expect the turnout and representation of foreign citizens to be lower than for nationals, which makes it even more surprising that ethnic minorities almost achieve their fair share of the seats in local councils in Denmark.
This article argues that the explanation ought to be found in the opportunity structure in Denmark, which makes it difficult for minorities to move upwards in social and economic life, whereas it is relatively easy for them to do so in politics. The key factor appears to be the Danish local election system, with its combination of proportional representation and preferential voting. This system is exceptionally conducive to collective mobilization, resulting in a relatively high voter turnout among ethnic minorities and a fair representation in local councils. The characteristics of the electoral system also help to explain the party affiliation and other attributes of the elected representatives.
The article describes the development in the representation of ethnic minorities since 1981 and in the composition of minority representatives, with a focus on the elections in 2001. It takes in all of the municipalities in Denmark and includes information about the characteristics of anyone from an ethnic minority background who has been elected to a local council since 1981. 1
The Political Opportunity Structure
In recent years, a number of comparative studies have demonstrated that when ethnic minorities from the same country of origin arrive in different countries or different cities with different political institutions, their political behaviour will also be different (Garbaye, 2000; Ireland, 1994; Koopmans and Statham, 2000; Soysal, 1994) .
The theories about the impact of the political opportunity structure have primarily been developed in connection with studies of social movements (Eisinger, 1973; Kitschelt, 1986; Kriesi et al., 1992) , though Koopmans and Statham (2000) have applied them to the political activities of ethnic minorities in Europe. Inspiration is also drawn from modern institutional theory (Hall and Taylor, 1996; March and Olsen, 1989) . The theory claims that the political institutions of the receiving state have a decisive impact on the political behaviour of the immigrants and at the same time predict distinct differences between countries and more modest differences between ethnic groups in the same country; or at least that the differences are accounted for by the opportunities for influence offered by the national institutions.
For the immigrants, the political opportunity structure consists of the migration regime, the electoral system, the party system, as well as the indigenous population's attitudes towards ethnic minorities. And when it comes to local elections, the electoral system supposedly plays an important role. In an analysis of the representation of ethnic minorities in British politics, Andrew Geddes (1998) argues that the single-member plurality constituency system in the UK renders it especially difficult for ethnic minorities to succeed in parliamentary elections. Conversely, this article claims that the Danish local election system has features that encourage the mobilization of ethnic minorities.
The Electoral System
Compared to most other countries, Denmark remains a very homogeneous country. At the beginning of 2004, there were 442,036 immigrants and their descendants living in Denmark, roughly 8 percent of the total population. Approximately 30 percent of these persons come from the Nordic countries, the EU or North America, and roughly 40 percent have received Danish citizenship. Turks and Yugoslavs constitute the largest immigrant groups, followed by Iraqis, Germans, Palestinians, Pakistanis and Somalis (Flygtninge i Danmark, 2004) .
Following the Swedish example, Denmark reformed its local election act in 1981, thereby giving foreign citizens with at least three years' uninterrupted legal residence the right to vote and stand for election in local elections, though not in national elections. In the local elections in 1981, roughly 1.5 percent of the electorate were foreign nationals. This number increased to 4 percent in 2001.
The local election system in Denmark has two major characteristics: first, it is a proportional system based on semi-open party lists; and, second, the selection of candidates from the party list is strongly influenced by each candidate's personal votes.
With the exception of Copenhagen, the local councils in Denmark have between nine and 31 members, and the council seats are allocated among the parties using the d'Hondt divisor method. Because the total number of seats in each municipality is relatively low, a party requires 3 to 8 percent of the votes cast to gain access to the local council. This system results in a reasonably proportional representation of parties, but it has a slight tendency to favour the large parties. As a consequence of the proportional system, the competition among parties is generally quite strong.
Subsequent to the allocation of seats to the respective political parties, the specific candidates must be selected from among all of the candidates on each party list. For this purpose, the personal votes for each candidate are used. The procedure depends on which type of list each party uses: a semi-open party list or an open list. Both types allow voters to choose between voting for a specific candidate or simply casting one's ballot for the party.
If the party uses a party list, which in this case is a semi-open system, the first step is to calculate a 'distributional figure' (Droop quota) by dividing the number of votes on the list by the number of seats won by the list, plus 1. Starting at the top of the list, the next step is to compare the candidate's personal votes with the distributional number. A candidate who has obtained a number of personal votes higher than or equal to the distributional figure is elected. If the distributional figure is not reached, the candidate will be conferred the number of unspecified list votes necessary to reach the distributional number. When all unspecified list votes are used, the remaining seats are, disregarding the list number, allocated in accordance with the candidates' personal votes (Elklit, 2005 Notwithstanding the choice of list organization, the final seats to be allocated on the larger parties' lists are thus decided by the number of personal votes, and these seats are occasionally very 'cheap', i.e. they require a modest number of personal votes. By way of example, in the 2001 local elections in the municipality of Copenhagen, the last seat on the Social Democratic list was allocated to a candidate who had obtained a mere 361 personal votes. This number should be compared to an electorate in the Copenhagen municipality of more than 400,000 persons. In the same election, the final seat on the Liberal Party's list in Aarhus Municipality was allocated to a candidate with 191 personal votes out of an electorate of more than 200,000 persons. These examples demonstrate that it is possible to gain a seat in a local council representing one of the large parties by obtaining less than 0.1 percent of the votes in the election as personal votes.
However, this is only the case for the larger parties with several elected representatives. The small parties receiving only enough votes for a single seat generally elect the front-runner on the list. And, once again, it does not matter in this case which type of list the party opts for.
The electoral systems in the other two Scandinavian countries, Norway and Sweden, resemble the Danish system, but differ as regards the impact of personal votes. The personal votes have a stronger influence on the candidate choice in Denmark than in Norway and Sweden. At the same time, the system is transparent and more transparent than in the other countries. It is not necessary to know or understand the distribution rules to figure out how the system works.
It goes without saying that the Danish system has strong incentives for social groups to mobilize in connection with local elections and nominate candidates for elections. This also applies in the case of ethnic minorities; however, minority candidates must be nominated by one of the ordinary parties, and primarily by one of the large parties, i.e. either the Social Democrats or the Liberal Party. If they form their own immigrant ballot or list, they generally require more than 5 percent of the vote to pass the thresholds of exclusion as well as the threshold of representation (cf. Lijphart and Gibberd, 1977) . At the same time, the intense competition among parties in a PR system creates incentives for the political parties to place ethnic minority candidates on the list. The combined result is that there are strong incentives for political parties and minority groups to cooperate.
A system with such characteristics ought to be conducive to ethnic minority mobilization, resulting in a relatively high number of minority members running for election, a high turnout among ethnic minorities, 2 and a decent representation of ethnic minorities in local councils. Moreover, the elected minority members of the local councils should primarily represent the two largest parties.
The Danish electoral system is also favourable to the representation of women, but this is primarily a result of the party list PR system used in all of the Nordic countries at both the local and national levels (Caul, 1999; Matland and Studlar, 1996) . In the 2005 Danish elections, women won 37 percent of the seats in the parliament and 26 percent of the seats in local councils. This is less than in Sweden, where women won 47 percent of parliamentary seats in the 2005 election, but it remains higher than in most non-Nordic countries. However, the preferential vote system does not work for women in the same way that it does for the ethnic minorities, because women do not constitute a minority in the electorate. It is the small groups, such as ethnic minorities, that are particularly favoured by the Danish local electoral system.
The Representation of Ethnic Minorities
The first step in the empirical analysis will be to compare the ethnic minorities' share of representatives with their share of the electorate (Table 1) . If we reserve the term 'ethnic minorities' to immigrants and their descendants from countries outside the Nordic countries, the EU and North America, roughly 3.5 percent of the voters in local elections belong to the ethnic minorities, and close to 60 percent of these are foreign nationals. However, there is considerable variation among the municipalities. In some municipalities, ethnic minorities make up less than 1 percent of the electorate in 2001 compared to 15-20 percent of the electorate in some Copenhagen suburbs. 3 In the 2001 elections, 1.1 percent of the elected representatives had an ethnic minority background, as compared to 3.5 percent of the electorate. This would appear to be a significant under-representation, but in reality it is not. As elsewhere, ethnic minorities in Denmark are not evenly distributed throughout the country, being concentrated instead in a small number of municipalities in Copenhagen and the suburbs surrounding the city, and in the larger provincial cities and towns. If we categorize the municipalities according to the density of ethnic minorities, and if, in each category, we compare the minority share of representatives to the share of the electorate, the result is quite different.
The relationship between the share of representatives and the share of the electorate is presented in Table 2 for four different types of municipality and for the last four local elections. If we start by considering the results The number of minority members in local councils in Denmark has increased over the years. In 1981, the first election in which foreign citizens had the right to vote, three minority representatives were elected to the local councils. In 1985, five minority representatives were elected; in 1989, 12 representatives; in 1993, 15 representatives; in 1997, 24 representatives; and in 2001, 51 minority representatives gained seats in local councils. As indicated in Table 2 , this increase is the result of two distinct developments: first, an increasing number of municipalities have moved up into the categories of 'higher density' municipalities and, second, the ethnic minority share of representatives has increased in each category.
Ethnic minorities are surprisingly well represented in local councils in Denmark, and better than is the case in the other Scandinavian countries. In the local elections in Norway in 2003, ethnic minorities were overrepresented in the three municipalities with the strongest minority electorate, while they were under-represented in most of the other larger municipalities (Bjørklund and Bergh, 2005) . Comparison with Sweden is more difficult, as the available information is not strictly comparable, but the representation here also appears to be weaker than in Denmark (SOU, 2001: 48) . Analyses from Great Britain also point to the under-representation of ethnic minorities in both parliament and local councils (Geddes, 1993 (Geddes, , 1998 .
Ethnic minorities do not receive a proportional share of representatives in the local elections in Denmark, but they are close. This is especially noteworthy, because immigrants without Danish citizenship also have the right to vote in local elections, and because immigrants possess limited social resources. Actually, ethnic minorities are proportionally better represented than women. We are far from the situation described by Kymlicka (1995) , where minorities only receive approximately a third of the representation they deserve.
To better understand why, we now turn to a more detailed analysis of the fate of ethnic minority candidates in the elections.
The Election Process
As stated above, two different systems apply when the seats are distributed among candidates from party lists: the parties may choose to use either semiopen or open lists. Regardless of the choice of list organization, however, the
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candidates are listed on the ballot in priority order, as decided by the party. For each candidate, we are therefore able to compare the number on the priority list with the election results: do the voters move minority candidates up or down the list? Do the voters rank them higher than the party did? Table 3 contains two different measures of how the candidates fare in the election. The upper part of the table simply displays the number of nominated ethnic minority candidates who moved up the list and the number who moved down. The result is very clear: many more candidates move up than down, indicating that minority candidates generally do better than other candidates.
However, it does not matter much whether a candidate moves up the list if this elevation does not provide a seat on the local council. The lower part of the table therefore shows the mandate consequences of the jump made by ethnic minority candidates. In the 2001 local elections, a total of 197 minority candidates were nominated for election. Fifty-one of these (26 percent) were actually elected, which is exactly the same proportion as for all nominated candidates. The table reveals, however, that only 20 of these candidates would have been elected if the allocation had followed the priorities on the party list. Thirty-one of the minority candidates were elected despite the fact that they were placed on the list in a position that would not normally produce a seat given the number of candidates elected for the party. They 'jumped the list', so to speak -a much more common feat among ethnic minority candidates than among ethnic majority candidates (Kjaer, 2000: 161 ff.) .
Why do ethnic minorities do so well in the elections? Is this primarily due to votes from the ethnic minority population or votes from ethnic Danes? It is not possible to provide an exact answer to this question, as the vote is secret and there are no surveys including such detailed information regarding voter behaviour. However, some indirect indicators suggest that the votes primarily come from the ethnic minorities. We can consider Aarhus Municipality as an example of this phenomenon. Aarhus has a strong concentration of ethnic minorities in one of the polling districts: Gjellerup. Comparing the number of personal votes cast for the minority candidates in Gjellerup with the rest of the municipality could provide a hint about the voting behaviour of the ethnic minorities. 4 The result of this comparison is illustrated in Table 4 , where the percentage of personal votes is shown for some of the more important ethnic minority candidates in Aarhus in 2001.
In the Gjellerup polling district, roughly 5,000 votes were cast. Twelve percent were personal votes for one of the Turkish candidates, 9 percent for one of the Lebanese candidates and 4 percent for a Somali candidate, i.e. 25 percent of the total votes cast were for these candidates. As Table 4 shows, the Turkish, Lebanese and Somali candidates received relatively many more votes in Gjellerup than in the rest of the municipality; and precisely these three groups are significantly overrepresented in the Gjellerup area.
The first candidate named in the table, Hüseyin Arac, is from Turkey and represents the Social Democrats. He had already been a member of the city council for two terms. In the previous term, he held the powerful post of chairman of the standing Social Affairs Committee. The Turks are the oldest and largest ethnic minority group in Aarhus, but still account for approximately only 1 percent of the electorate in local elections in the city. Nevertheless, two people with Turkish roots were elected to the city council, Hüseyin Arac one of them. In the 2001 elections, Arac received 1,722 personal votes, or 3 percent of all of the Social Democratic votes in Aarhus. This placed him fourth among the 11 Social Democratic members of the council. Arac received 18 percent of the Social Democratic votes in Gjellerup, compared to 3 percent in the entire municipality. It thus appears fair to conclude that, in 2001, Arac received a higher share of the ethnic minority votes than of the votes from ethnic Danes. At the same time, it is also evident Turkish descendent Bünyamin Simsek was also elected to the local council in 2001, representing the Liberal Party. Simsek received 0.4 percent of the Liberal Party votes as personal votes in Aarhus municipality, but a whopping 9 percent of the party's votes in Gjellerup. The same relationship between the number of votes in Gjellerup as opposed to the municipality in general is found among the Lebanese and Somali candidates. They sought to represent minor parties with fewer seats in the city council and were therefore unsuccessful in gaining election; however, they also received a much larger share of their party votes in Gjellerup than elsewhere.
However, this pattern was not duplicated for all ethnic minority candidates in Aarhus. For instance, Ivan Guzman from Chile, who stood for the Social Democrats, indeed received a larger share of the votes in Gjellerup than elsewhere, but he still did not get many votes there. This may be explained by the fact that the number of refugees from Chile residing in Aarhus is limited; in contrast to the previously mentioned candidates, Guzman lacked his own ethnic constituency in Aarhus. Of perhaps even greater interest is the Social Liberal candidate, Ouafa Rian, from Morocco. She was not elected, and received an even smaller share of the vote in Gjellerup than in the rest of the municipality. For one thing, not many Moroccans live in Aarhus. Additionally, Rian was a woman, and she was working as a progressive event manager in Aarhus. The distribution of personal votes suggests that she did not receive many personal votes from the more traditional immigrant community in Gjellerup.
The analyses in this section lead to the conclusion that the surprisingly strong representation of ethnic minorities in Danish local councils is supported by an election process in which minority candidates fare better than ethnic Danes, which to some extent is a result of the ethnic minorities voting for their own candidates.
The Characteristics of Elected Candidates
The analysis has thus far demonstrated that the special features of the local election system in Denmark explain the fair representation of ethnic minorities in local councils. In this section, it is further argued that the election system also influences the types of candidate elected: their party affiliation, ethnic background and occupation.
Most minority representatives have traditionally been elected by the Social Democrats, which has been the case in all elections since 1981. In 2001, 60 percent of the ethnic minority members represented the Social Democrats, a smaller share than in previous years.
It is worth mentioning that the Social Democrats do not have the same predominance among the ethnic minority candidates as they have among the elected representatives. As indicated in Table 5 , the deciding factor is that Social Democratic candidates enjoy a much greater chance of gaining election once they are nominated than do the other minority candidates. On average, 26 percent of the ethnic minority candidates are elected, whereas 62 percent of the Social Democratic minority candidates are elected. This can be compared to the election chances for candidates representing the most immigrant friendly parties in Denmark: the Red-Greens (8 percent), the Social Liberals (9 percent) and the Socialist People's Party (12 percent). Only the candidates representing the Liberals had a fairly good chance of gaining election (33 percent).
These variations are accounted for by differences in party size, combined with the regulations of the local election system. As illustrated in Table 4 , the Social Democrats and Liberals are the two major parties in local elections. In many municipalities, the other parties only gain one or two seats, if any. In the case of a single seat to a small party, the seat will almost inevitably go to the top candidate on the party list. This applies especially to the Red-Greens and the Socialist People's Party, as these parties normally use a semi-open party list as opposed to an open list. However, in the case of the two large parties, the Social Democrats and the Liberals, mandates are always allocated in accordance with the number of personal votes, and thus the candidates nominated by these parties have a much better chance of jumping the list.
Nevertheless, there is a major difference between the 31 elected Social Democrats and the six Liberals. Not only do the Social Democrats elect the highest number of minority representatives to the local councils, they also Total  197  51  24  15  12  7  3 have the highest number nominated. The explanations for this exceptional situation are threefold. First, the first immigrants arriving in Denmark were migrant workers who had a natural inclination to become involved in the labour movement. Second, the Social Democrats are particularly strong in urban municipalities with a high share of ethnic minorities, whereas the Liberals are particularly strong in rural areas with a small minority electorate. Finally, the fact that the Social Democratic candidates actually get elected most likely plays a role. Some of the ethnic minority candidates have been elected election after election, which demonstrates to the ethnic minorities that being nominated by the Social Democrats is worthwhile. As indicated in Table 5 , it is rare that a candidate from a special immigrant list has been elected, even though there have been such lists in each election. This has only happened twice, in 1993 and in 1997. The explanation is simple: as already described, depending on the size of the council, a party requires 3 to 8 percent of the vote to gain a single seat, whereas 0.1 percent of the vote can be sufficient to gain a seat if one is on the ballot for one of the large parties. It is therefore much easier to gain election on one of the ordinary party lists than by 'going solo'. There is nothing indicating that the number of special immigrant lists is on the rise, even though the number of immigrants is increasing. The ethnic minorities have discovered how the system works.
Not all ethnic groups are equally represented in the local councils. The obvious expectation would be that representation of the different minorities would follow the size of the minority group and their immigration history. This would mean that the early groups of migrant workers ought to be better represented than especially the most recent refugee groups, which is also true to a certain degree. The Turks are the largest immigrant group in Denmark and were among the first to arrive in the country around 1970. Migrant workers from Turkey were the first to be elected to the local councils, and they remain the best represented group. In 2001, close to 50 percent of the ethnic minority representatives had a Turkish backgroundthough this was less than in previous years. On the other hand, there have never been many members representing the other two big groups of migrant workers, the Yugoslavs and the Pakistanis. In the Pakistani case, a shift appears to have occurred in the elections in 2001, when a fairly large number of Pakistanis were both nominated and elected.
A considerable number of candidates from the traditional 'refugee countries' gained election for the first time in the 2001 elections. In 1997, one Palestinian refugee, Naser Khader, 5 was elected to the city council in Copenhagen. By contrast, five people from Lebanon, three from Sri Lanka and one each from Iran, Bosnia, Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan were elected in 2001. Moreover, Naser Khader and Kamal Qureshi, a Pakistani, were elected to parliament.
If we focus on the nominated candidates in 2001, there are a considerable number of people with roots in Iran, Lebanon and Pakistan, in addition to the Turks. All of the largest immigrant groups are represented, except the Vietnamese -a group also characterized by a low voter turnout. New immigrant groups apparently begin to appear on the ballots some 10-15 years subsequent to the first members of the group arriving in Denmark.
However, there is considerable variation between the ethnic groups, the most remarkable being the strong over-representation of Turks. This is particularly surprising, as the Turks had relatively few social and educational resources upon arrival in Denmark -at least compared to the other groups of migrant workers. The strong representation might have something to do with the size of the Turkish community in Denmark: in many municipalities, there is a sufficient number of Turks to make ethnic mobilization meaningful. The same is actually true for Pakistanis and Yugoslavs. It must therefore also have something to do with the political traditions in the different groups. Table 6 also shows that election chances differ relatively greatly between ethnic groups. The Turks again do best, whereas the Iranians, for instance, do poorly. Approximately 40 percent of the nominated Turks were elected, as compared to 4 percent of the Iranians, and roughly 30 percent of the nominated Lebanese, Yugoslavs and Pakistanis were elected. The interesting question is why the Iranians fare so poorly compared to the other ethnic groups. Two things explain the fate of the Iranians: first, the Iranians are primarily nominated by small left-wing parties which have very few elected Table 6 . Number of elected minority representatives by country of origin 2001 2001 1997 1993 1989 1985 1981 Turkey 61 candidates in local elections. Second, in contrast to the Turks, the Iranians are not concentrated in a few municipalities; rather, they are more thinly dispersed throughout the country. None of the municipalities have enough Iranians to be able to elect a candidate of their own. Again, the function of the preferential voting system explains the outcome of the election. Finally, we can ask whether other interesting characteristics differentiate the nominated and elected ethnic minority candidates from ordinary minority members. The first thing to notice is that most of the elected minority representatives have obtained Danish citizenship. Even though foreign citizens can also be elected to the local councils, only 25 percent of the elected candidates hold foreign citizenship. This can be compared to the 60 percent of the minority electorate possessing foreign citizenship.
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The next characteristic worth mentioning is that, in all years, most of the elected representatives are men. In the 2001 elections, seven of the 51 elected ethnic minority candidates were women, i.e. 14 percent. This was less than the overall female share of the representatives in local councils, which was 27 percent. In any case, however, the ethnic minority representatives are not exclusively male.
A third interesting characteristic is that the elected representatives generally occupy higher social positions than the average immigrant. In Denmark, labour market participation is generally rather low among immigrants, with many dependent on welfare (Coleman and Wadensjö, 1999: 177 ff.) . However, that is not the case for the nominated and elected candidates for local councils (Table 7 ). All of the elected candidates are employed or are students, as is the case with almost all of the nominated candidates, though here we have a higher level of missing information. The educational level of the representatives is also high. A relatively large number have completed a college education in technology, health or as social workers, and there are a number of university students and graduates, whereas there are very few unskilled workers. While people from the traditional migrant worker countries are elected to the councils, few of the candidates in 2001 had a traditional 'migrant worker' occupation. Particularly remarkable is that a disproportionately large number of the elected and nominated ethnic minority candidates are employed in the public sector and work directly with improving the integration of immigrants within Danish society. Among the 127 persons with a known occupation, roughly one-third worked as interpreters, social workers, bilingual teachers, etc. As part of their job, these people have been in close contact with the political and administrative system in Denmark. Over an extended period, they have established networks with other important actors in the local community. In short, it is those building the bridges between the immigrant community and the municipality who have entered local politics. 6 The more scattered information from the earlier years suggests that this has been the case from the very outset.
Another indication that the bridge-builders enter the local councils is that a surprisingly high share of the ethnic minority members sat in the local 'integration councils' prior to their nomination as candidates for local election. In connection with a new integration law in 1999, the municipalities were obliged to form an 'integration council' if such a request was made by a certain number of citizens. In 2001, approximately one-quarter of the Danish municipalities had established an integration council -primarily the municipalities with large immigrant populations. In the 2001 elections, 26 percent of the ethnic minority representatives in local councils had been members of the immigration councils in the preceding years (Togeby, 2003a) . The immigration councils evidently served as a recruitment base for the local councils, which also underlines that the ethnic minority members of the local councils were recruited from among the bridge-builders in the ethnic society.
The strong representation of bridge-builders can also be interpreted as a result of the election system. As already shown, in order to gain election, the ethnic minority candidates must be nominated by one of the big parties in the municipality, and it is necessary for the ethnic community and the political parties to cooperate. The candidates who manage to be both nominated and elected must inspire confidence in both the local political parties and the ethnic community.
Almost all ethnic minority representatives elected before 2001 originally immigrated to Denmark as migrant workers. By 2001, however, a substantial number of the nominated and elected candidates were born in Denmark or had arrived as small children. They have lived their childhood and youth in Denmark, attended Danish schools and they speak flawless Danish. There were also a number of very young people among the nominees and those ultimately elected. It appears that a new type of very ambitious ethnic minority politician has emerged using the open electoral system as a short cut to social mobilization in Denmark.
The Election System as a Channel for Mobilization
The empirical analysis has revealed that the ethnic minorities are very well represented in the Danish local councils and much better represented than in other countries. Denmark would thus appear to be a deviant case.
The explanation for this anomaly is the combination of two characteristics of the political opportunity structure in Denmark resulting in the political mobilization of numerous ethnic minority groups. First, the local council electoral system is wide open for the recruitment of representatives from smaller groups. As shown above, for a candidate on one of the large parties' lists, gaining the votes of as little as 0.1 percent of the registered voters may be sufficient to gain a seat in a local council. For many groups, it will be fairly easy to mobilize such numbers. This renders the system more open to minority groups than most other systems.
Second, it is generally very difficult for immigrants to advance to elite positions in Danish society, especially if their Danish language skills are less than perfect. Politics provides one of the few relatively open career channels. This is reminiscent of the situation in the United States at the beginning and in the middle of the twentieth century. In a discussion of manifest and latent functions, Robert K. Merton (1949) describes the functioning of the traditional party machines and reveals how they had the latent function of providing channels for social mobility for groups excluded from other channels. The situation is precisely the same for immigrants in Denmark at the beginning of the twenty-first century.
The key factor in the electoral system is the combination of proportional and preferential characteristics in the system. However, it is interesting to note that not all systems combining preferential voting and a proportional distribution of the seats have the same results as the Danish system. Both Norway and Sweden employ systems with the same combination of characteristics, but the preferential system is organized differently, producing different consequences. First, the Danish system is not merely open, it is also transparent: it is easy to understand how the system works and to make an educated guess regarding one's chances for election. Second, the Swedish system requires a much higher number of personal votes to influence the priority of the candidates. Third, in the Norwegian system, it is possible for the parties to give 'additional votes' to top candidates on the list, thereby preventing any over-representation of minority groups (Bjørklund and Bergh, 2005) . It is the very special characteristics of the Danish preferential system that result in the surprisingly high representation of ethnic minorities in Danish local councils.
We are still left with questions about the role of these councillors and the policy impact of the representation of ethnic minorities in local councils. Unfortunately, due to the lack of research regarding these issues, we can only speculate. However, if we are to place our trust in Ann Phillips (1995) and her theory regarding 'the politics of presence', equal representation is the first step towards equal influence.
Notes

